Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: Complexity results  by Pini, M.S. et al.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1272–1289Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Artiﬁcial Intelligence
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation:
Complexity results
M.S. Pini a, F. Rossi a, K.B. Venable a,∗, T. Walsh b
a Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics, University of Padova, Italy
b NICTA and UNSW Sydney, Australia
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 27 February 2009
Received in revised form 1 July 2010
Accepted 1 July 2010
Available online 1 December 2010
Keywords:
Preference in multi-agent systems
Preference aggregation
Computational complexity
Uncertainty
Elicitation
We consider how to combine the preferences of multiple agents despite the presence of
incompleteness and incomparability in their preference relations over possible candidates.
The set of preference relations of an agent may be incomplete because, for example,
there is an ongoing preference elicitation process. There may also be incomparability as
this is useful, for example, in multi-criteria scenarios. We focus here on the problem
of computing the possible and necessary winners, that is, those candidates which can
be, or always are, the most preferred for the agents. Possible and necessary winners
are useful in many scenarios including preference elicitation. First, we show that testing
possible and necessary winners is in general a computationally intractable problem for
STV with unweighted votes and the cup rule with weighted votes, as is providing a
good approximation of such sets. Then, we identify general properties of the preference
aggregation function, such as independence to irrelevant alternatives, which are suﬃcient
for such sets to be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show how possible and
necessary winners can be used to focus preference elicitation. We show that it is
computationally intractable for the cup rule with weighted votes in the worst-case to
decide when to terminate elicitation. However, we identify a property of the preference
aggregation function that allows us to decide when to terminate elicitation in polynomial
time, by focusing on possible and necessary winners.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We consider a multi-agent setting where each agent speciﬁes their preferences by means of a set of preference relations
over the possible candidates. A pair of candidates can be ordered, incomparable, in a tie, or the relationship between
them may not yet be speciﬁed. Incomparability and incompleteness represent very different concepts. Candidates may be
incomparable because the agent does not wish very dissimilar candidates to be compared. For example, we might not want
to compare a biography with a novel since the criteria along which we judge them are just too different. Candidates can also
be incomparable because the agent has multiple criteria to optimize. For example, we might not wish to compare a faster
but more expensive laptop with a slower and cheaper one. Incompleteness, on the other hand, represents simply an absence
of knowledge about the relationship between certain pairs of candidates. Incompleteness arises when we have not fully
elicited an agent’s preferences or when agents have privacy concerns which prevent them from revealing their preferences.
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aggregation functions to deal with incompleteness. One possibility is to consider all possible ways in which the incomplete
preference orders can be consistently completed. In each possible completion, preference aggregation may give different
optimal elements (or winners). This leads to the idea of possible winners (those candidates which are winners in at least one
possible completion) and necessary winners (those candidates which are winners in all possible completions) [14].
While voting theory has been mainly interested in the fairness of social choice or social welfare functions, there has
been recent interest in computational properties of preference aggregation [19,15,14,10]. It has already been noted that the
computational complexity of manipulating an election is closely related to that of computing possible winners [14,9]. In this
paper we start by considering the computational complexity of testing if a given candidate is a necessary or a possible win-
ner for STV and the cup rule. We consider two different dimensions: weighted/unweighted agents and bounded/unbounded
number of candidates. Weights are useful in multi-agent systems where we have different types of agents and some agent
may have more importance than some other agent in the process of taking a decision. We provide the computational com-
plexity of computing the necessary and possible winners in all of the considered scenarios in the worst case. Moreover, we
show that it is intractable even to obtain a good approximation of such sets, except when we have unweighted agents and
a bounded number of candidates. Then, we identify suﬃcient conditions that assure tractability. Such conditions concern
properties of the preference aggregation function, such as monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) [2].
Notice that IIA is a strong assumption. However, it is useful to show that intractability is not always the case for computing
possible/necessary winners in the general case.
We stress that worst-case complexity results like these are only the start to our understanding the complexity of com-
puting possible and necessary winners. The complexity of these problems in practice may still be easy. For example, a
number of recent theoretical results suggest that the closely related problem of manipulating an election may be NP-hard
in the worst case but computationally easy in practice [11].
Possible and necessary winners are useful in many scenarios including preference elicitation [6]. In fact, elicitation can
be terminated when the set of possible winners coincides with that of the necessary winners [10]. We show that deciding
when to terminate the elicitation process for the cup rule with weighted votes is a computationally intractable problem.
However, if the preference aggregation function is IIA, preference elicitation can be stopped in polynomial time. This can
be done by focusing just on the incompleteness concerning those candidates which are possible and necessary winners,
allowing us to ignore all other candidates.
The paper is a revised and an extended version of [18,17,22].
2. Basic notions
We now introduce some basic notions on which our work is based. First, we give the deﬁnitions regarding preference
relations and incomplete proﬁles. We, then, consider the notions of preference aggregation functions, possible and necessary
winners and describe how to represent compactly the set of the results of a preference aggregation function. We conclude
by motivating the usefulness of weighted votes in terms of some real-world setting.
2.1. Preferences and incomplete proﬁles
We assume that each agent’s preferences (that is, each agent’s vote) are speciﬁed via a partially speciﬁed pre-order over the
set of possible candidates, that we will denote by Ω .1 A partially speciﬁed pre-order is a pre-order (PO) (that is, a reﬂexive,
antisymmetric and transitive relation) plus an additional set of pairs that represent unspeciﬁed preferences. More precisely,
given two candidates A and B , an agent can specify one of the following:
• A < B , that is, B is preferred to A;
• A > B , that is, A is preferred to B;
• A ∼ B , that is, A and B are equally preferred;
• A  B , that is, A and B are incomparable (i.e., neither A > B nor B > A, nor A ∼ B);
• A?B , that is, the relation between A and B is unknown; this means that it could be any element of {∼,>,<,}.
Example 1. Given candidates A, B , and C , an agent may state preferences such as A > B , B  C , and A > C , or also just
A > B and B  C , that corresponds to preferences A > B , B  C and A?C . However, an agent cannot state preferences such
as A > B , B > C , C > A, or also A > B , B > C , A  C since they don’t satisfy transitivity and thus they are not POs.
Deﬁnition 1 (Proﬁle). A proﬁle is a sequence of n pre-orders p1, . . . , pn over the candidates, one for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
describing the preferences of the agents. The pre-order of a single agent is also called a vote.
1 We believe the assumption of agents expressing their preferences via pre-orders is reasonable in the context of this paper, although it is known that
sometimes preferences of human beings are not transitive.
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Deﬁnition 2 (Incomplete proﬁle). An incomplete proﬁle is a sequence of n partially speciﬁed pre-orders ip1, . . . , ipn over
candidates, one for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Example 2. Given three agents and three candidates A, B , and C , a possible incomplete proﬁle is ((A > B > C )2; (A > C ,
A > B , B?C ); (C > A, A?B , B?C )).
Deﬁnition 3 (Completions of a proﬁle). Given a proﬁle p, a completion of p is a proﬁle obtained from p by replacing every ?
with an element in {>,<,∼,}. Since completions are proﬁles, the replacement of every ? with an element in {>,<,∼,}
must be done in such a way as to respect transitivity.
2.2. Social welfare and preference aggregation
Social welfare functions [2] are functions from proﬁles to pre-orders. Social choice functions (also known as voting rules) [5]
are functions from proﬁles to candidates. Given a proﬁle p and a social welfare function f , f (p) is the pre-order obtained
applying f to p. We will denote with f (p)(A, B) the restriction of the pre-order f (P ) to A and B . When p is obvious from
the context, we will simply write f (A, B).
In what follows we will consider social welfare functions and social choice functions that take polynomial time to apply.
This assumption allows us to obtain stronger intractability results.
Example 3. An example of a social welfare function is the Pareto rule [2]. The Pareto social welfare function f works as
follows: given a proﬁle p, for any two candidates A and B , if all agents say A > B or A ∼ B and at least one says A > B in
p, then A > B in f (p); if all agents say A ∼ B in p, then A ∼ B in f (p); otherwise, A  B in f (p).
Example 4. An example of a social choice function is the plurality rule [2]: given a totally ordered proﬁle, the candidate
voted ﬁrst by most agents wins. Clearly, either several candidates may win, or some tie-breaking rules must be used to
select a single winner. If there are just two candidates, plurality is also called the majority rule. Another well-known social
choice rule is Borda: given m candidates, the agents preferences are used to rank them (1st gets m − 1 points, 2nd gets
m− 2 points, etc., last one gets 0 points), and the candidate with the most points wins.
Given a social welfare function, we deﬁne a corresponding preference aggregation function as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 (Preference aggregation function). Given a social welfare function f , its corresponding preference aggregation
function, written pa f , is a function from incomplete proﬁles to sets of pre-orders that maps every incomplete proﬁle ip =
(ip1, . . . , ipn), into the set pa f (ip) = { f (p1), . . . , f (pk)}, that will be called the set of results of f on proﬁle ip. The set of the
results is obtained by applying f to all the completions of ip, say p1, . . . , pk .
Example 5. Consider the Pareto social welfare function f described in Example 3. In Fig. 1 we show how its corresponding
preference aggregation function works. Assume we have three agents and three candidates A, B , and C , and that the agents
express their preferences via the incomplete proﬁle ip = (ip1, ip2, ip3) shown in the upper part of Fig. 1. We consider all
the completions of ip and we obtain the proﬁles p1 and p2. Note that these two proﬁles are the only two completions of
ip. In fact, the completion with A ∼ C (resp., A < C ) in ip1 would not be consistent with the known part of ip1, since, by
transitivity, it should be A ∼ C > B (resp., B < A < C ) and thus C > B (resp., B < C ) and not B  C . Finally, f is applied
to both p1 and p2, thus obtaining the set of the result pa f (ip) = { f (p1), f (p2)}. The notion of the combined result will be
deﬁned later in the paper.
The literature on social welfare has considered several desired properties of social welfare and social choice functions.
Such properties have often been used to derive crucial impossibility results, such as Arrow’s theorem [3,1] and Gibbard–
Satterthwaite’s theorem [12,20], that give interesting insights about the fairness and manipulability of such functions. In
particular, Arrow’s theorem shows that it is impossible to have at the same time certain reasonable properties (such as
non-dictatorship and unanimity), while Gibbard–Satterthwaite’s theorem shows that a function is always either dictatorial
or manipulable, if all candidates can win. In this paper we will consider some of these desirable properties, that we will
sometimes assume to prove our results.
The ﬁrst desirable property we consider is anonymity [2].
2 In the rest of the paper we will use shortenings such as A > B > C for A > B , B > C and A > C .
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Deﬁnition 5 (Anonymity). A social welfare function f is said to be anonymous when the result does not depend on the
order of the votes within the proﬁle.
We assume from now on that all social welfare functions are anonymous. The second desired property we consider is
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) [2].
Deﬁnition 6 (IIA). A social welfare function f is said to be IIA when, for every proﬁle p, for every pair of candidates A and
B , f (A, B) depends only on the relation between A and B in the preference orderings of p.
Many preference aggregation functions are IIA (such as the Pareto rule shown in Example 3), and this is a property which
is related to the notion of fairness in voting theory [2].
Another desired property that a social choice function can satisfy is monotonicity.
Deﬁnition 7 (Monotonicity). A social welfare function f is monotonic if, for any two proﬁles p and p′ and any two candidates
A and B , if passing from p to p′ , B improves with respect to A in the preference ordering of an agent i and p j = p′j for
all j = i, then, passing from f (p) to f (p′), B improves with respect to A. A candidate B improves with respect to another
candidate A if the relationship between A and B does not move left along the following sequence: >, ( or ∼), <.3
In words, if B is preferable to A in the result, and we move to a proﬁle where B is not worsened w.r.t. A, then B is still
preferable to A in the new result.
Example 6. The Pareto rule shown in Example 3 is both IIA and monotonic.
2.3. Necessary and possible winners
We extend the notions of possible and necessary winners presented in [14] for total orders to the case of pre-orders.
A necessary winner must be a winner, no matter how incompleteness is resolved in the incomplete proﬁle, while a possible
winner is a winner in at least one possible completion of the incomplete proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 8 (Necessary winner). Given a social welfare function f and an incomplete proﬁle ip, a necessary winner of f
given ip is a candidate which is a maximal element in all POs contained in pa f (ip).
4
Deﬁnition 9 (Possible winner). Given a social welfare function f and an incomplete proﬁle ip, a possible winner is a candidate
which is a maximal element in at least one of the POs contained in pa f (ip).
We will write NW( f , ip) and PW( f , ip) for the set of necessary and possible winners of f on proﬁle ip. We will some-
times omit f and/or ip, and just write NW and PW when the two parameters are obvious or irrelevant.
Example 7. In Example 5, candidates A and B are necessary winners, since they are maximal elements in all POs f (pi), for
all i = 1,2. Candidate C is a possible winner, since it wins in f (p2). However, C is not a necessary winner, since it does not
win in f (p1).
3 For example, B improves with respect to A if it passes from A  B to A < B or if it remains the same.
4 In a pre-order, a candidate C is a maximal element if there is no candidate C ′ such C ′ > C .
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The set of results of a preference aggregation function can be exponentially large. We will therefore also consider a
compact representation that is polynomial in size. This may throw away information by compacting together results into a
single combined result.
Deﬁnition 10 (Combined result). Given a social welfare function f and an incomplete proﬁle ip, the combined result of f on
ip, denoted by cr( f , ip), is a graph, whose nodes are the candidates, and whose arcs are labeled by non-empty subsets of
{<,>,∼,}. Label l is on the arc between candidates A and B if there exists a PO in pa f (ip) where A and B are related
by l. If an arc is labeled by set {<,>,∼,}, we will say that it is fully incomplete. Otherwise, we say that it is partially
incomplete. The set of labels on the arc between A and B will be called rel(A, B).
Example 8. Consider the preference aggregation function and the proﬁle presented in Example 5. The corresponding com-
bined result is shown in the right part of Fig. 1. In this combined result, no arc is fully incomplete.
2.5. Weighted votes
As in [9], we will consider both weighted and unweighted agents. An agent whose weight is an integer k can be viewed
as k agents who vote identically. Although human elections are often unweighted, the addition of weights makes voting
schemes more general. Weighted voting systems are also used in a number of real-world settings like shareholder meetings
and elected assemblies. Weights are useful in multi-agent systems where we have different types of agents. Weights are also
interesting from a computational perspective. First, weights can increase computational complexity. Second, the weighted
case informs us about the unweighted case when we have probabilistic information about the votes. For instance, if it is
NP-hard to compute if the election can be manipulated with weighted votes, then it is NP-hard to compute the probability
of a candidate winning when there is uncertainty about how the unweighted votes have been cast [9]. To reduce the impact
of ties, we assume that the sum of weights is odd.
3. Complexity of winner determination
We now give worst-case complexity results about computing and testing possible and necessary winners, as well as
ﬁnding a good approximation of such a set of winners.
3.1. Unweighted votes
We ﬁrst assume we have unweighted agents. In this context, we analyze the complexity of computing and testing
possible and necessary winners, and also of ﬁnding good approximations of them, both when we have a bounded number
of candidates and when we have an unbounded number of candidates.
3.1.1. Bounded number of candidates
If we have a bounded number of candidates and unweighted votes, the possible and necessary winners can be computed
in polynomial time.
Given an incomplete unweighted proﬁle over a bounded number of candidates, a voting rule r, and a candidate A,
we say that UnweightedBoundedPossibleWinner(r) holds iff A is a possible winner of the election, and we say that
UnweightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(r) holds iff A is a necessary winner of the election.
Theorem 1. Given a voting rule r, UnweightedBoundedPossibleWinner(r) and UnweightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(r) are
both polynomial.
Proof. By assumption, the underlying social welfare function is anonymous. If there are n agents and m candidates, then
(n + 1)m! is an upper bound for the number of completions to consider since each of the m! possible votes can be chosen
by k possible agents, where k is between 0 and n. As m is bounded, we can enumerate all such completions, and apply the
social welfare function to them in polynomial time. Hence, computing exactly the sets of possible and necessary winners is
polynomial.5 
5 A similar argument was made in [9,8] to show that manipulation of an election by a coalition of agents is polynomial when the number of candidates
is bounded.
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Suppose now that the number of candidates is not bounded. In this context, testing necessary and possible winners is
NP-hard, even if we restrict ourselves to partially speciﬁed but total orders. We will consider the following, well known,
voting rule.
Deﬁnition 11 (Single Transferable Vote). Single Transferable Vote with one winner (STV) [4] is a voting rule where the proﬁle
consists of a set of total orders over candidates, and the quota of an election (that is, the minimum number of votes
necessary to get elected) is 	n/2
 + 1, where n is the number of agents. Initially, an agent’s vote is allocated to his most
preferred candidate. If no candidate exceeds the quota, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and the procedure
is repeated with the new proﬁle until some candidate reaches the quota.6
Example 9. Consider the proﬁle p = ((A > B > C); (B > A > C); (C > A > B); (B > A > C); (A > C > B)). We now show how
the STV rule works on p. The minimum number of votes to get elected, i.e., the quota is 3. In the ﬁrst round both A and
B receive 2 points, and C receives 1 point. Hence, no agent reaches the quota. Then, C is removed and the procedure is
repeated. In the second round only A reaches the quota and thus he is elected.
In what follows we consider STV elections in which some total orders, provided by the agents, may be partially speciﬁed.
In general, given an incomplete unweighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, a voting rule r, and
a candidate A, we say UnweightedUnboundedPossibleWinner(r) holds iff A is a possible winner of the election. We
also deﬁne Effective Preference(r) as the problem of determining if a particular candidate can win an election with one
unknown vote.
Theorem 2. UnweightedUnboundedPossibleWinner(STV) is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP follows by giving a completion of the proﬁle in which a candidate A wins. NP-completeness
follows from the result that Effective Preference(STV) is NP-complete [4]. In fact, an election with one unknown vote is a
speciﬁc incomplete proﬁle. Thus one can reduce polynomially (by just taking the same proﬁle) Effective Preference(STV)
on candidate A. UnweightedUnboundedPossibleWinner(STV). 
Given an incomplete unweighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, a voting rule r and a candidate A,
we say UnweightedUnboundedNecessaryWinner(r) holds iff A is a necessary winner of the election.
Theorem 3. UnweightedUnboundedNecessaryWinner(STV) is coNP-complete.
Proof. Let us assume that we are considering whether candidate A is a necessary winner. The complement problem is in
NP since we can show membership by giving a completion of the proﬁle in which some B different from A wins.
To show completeness of the complement problem, we give a reduction from Effective Preference(STV) in which B
appears in ﬁrst place in at least one vote. This restricted form of Effective Preference(STV) is NP-complete [4]. Consider an
incomplete proﬁle p in which n+1 votes have been cast, B has at least one ﬁrst place vote, one vote remains unknown, and
we wish to decide if B can win. We construct a new election from p with n new additional votes, and one new candidate
A. We put A at the top of each of these new votes, and rank the other candidates in any order within these n votes. We
place A in last place in the original n+ 1 votes, except for one vote where B is in ﬁrst place (by assumption, one such vote
must exist) where we place A in second place and shift all other candidates down. We observe that A will survive till the
last round as A has at least n votes and no other candidate can have as many votes till the last round. We also observe
that, if B remains in the election, the score given to each candidate by STV remains the same as in the original election, so
the candidates are eliminated in the same order up till the point B is eliminated. If B is eliminated before the last round,
the second choice vote for A is transferred. Since A now has n + 1 votes, A is unbeatable and must win the election. If B
survives, on the other hand, to the last round, we can assume A is ranked at the bottom of the unknown vote. All the other
candidates but B and A have been eliminated so B has n+ 1 votes and is unbeatable. Hence, A is not the necessary winner
of this new election if and only if B is a possible winner in the Effective Preference election. Thus determining if A is not
the necessary winner of this new election is as hard as determining if B is a possible winner of the Effective Preference
election which is known to be NP-complete. 
Given these results, we might wonder if it is easy to compute a reasonable approximation of the sets of possible and
necessary winners in the worst-case. Unfortunately this is not the case. The reduction described in the proof of Theorem 3
shows that we cannot easily approximate the set of possible winners within a factor of two. In fact, we can show that we
cannot easily approximate the set of possible winners within any constant factor.
6 STV requires a tie-breaking rule (at different stages of the execution of the protocol). This rule is usually left undeﬁned. The results in this article do
not depend on tie-breaking rules.
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a superset of its possible winners, PW∗ , in which we guarantee |PW∗| < k|PW| for some given positive integer k.
Proof. We again give a reduction from Effective Preference(STV) in which A appears in ﬁrst place at least in one vote.
Consider an incomplete proﬁle p in which n + 1 votes have been cast, A has at least one ﬁrst place vote, one vote remains
unknown, and we wish to decide if A can win. We construct a new election from p. We make k copies of p. In the ith
copy c(p)i , we subscript each candidate with the integer i. We add n new additional votes, and one new candidate B . We
put B at the top of each of these new votes, and rank all the other candidates except Ai in any order within these n votes.
The ranking of the candidates Ai is left unknown but beneath B . In each c(p)i , we place B in last place except for one vote
where Ai is in ﬁrst place (by assumption, one such vote must exist) where we place B in second place and shift all other
candidates down. Finally, for each candidate in c(p) j not in c(p)i except for A j , we rank them in any order at the bottom
of the votes in c(p)i . The ranking of the candidates Ai is again left unknown but beneath B . We observe that B will survive
till all but one candidate has been eliminated from one of the c(p)i . We also observe that if Ai remains in the election,
then the score given to each candidate by STV remains the same as in the original election so the candidates in c(p)i are
eliminated in the same order up till the point Ai is eliminated. Suppose A cannot win the original election. Then Ai will
always be eliminated before the ﬁnal round. The second choice vote for B is transferred. Since B now has at least n + 1
votes, B is unbeatable and must win the election. Suppose, on the other hand, that A can win the original election. Then Ai
can survive to be the last remaining candidate in c(p)i . We can assume B is ranked at the bottom of the unknown votes of
all the candidates with an index i and above all the candidates with an index j different from i. Thus Ai has n+ 1 votes. If
we have the corresponding ranking in the other unknown votes, A j for j = i will also survive. Since B has only n votes, B
will be eliminated. It is now possible for any of the candidates, Ai where 1 i  k to win depending on how exactly the Ai
are ranked in the different votes. Thus the set of possible winners is {ai | 1 i  k} plus B if A is not a necessary winner
in the original election. Hence, if A is a possible winner in the original election, the size of the set of possible winners is
greater than or equal to k, whilst if it is not, the set is of size 1. If we know that |PW∗| < k|PW|, then |PW∗| < k guarantees
that |PW| = 1, that B is the necessary winner, and hence that A is not a possible winner in the original election. 
Similarly, we cannot approximate eﬃciently the set of necessary winners within some ﬁxed ratio.
Theorem 5. Given the STV rule and an incomplete unweighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, it is NP-hard to return
a subset of its necessary winners, NW∗ , in which we guarantee |NW∗| > 1k |NW| whenever |NW| > 0 for any given positive integer k.
Proof. In the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 4, |NW| = 1 if A is a possible winner in the original election and 0
otherwise. Suppose A is a possible winner. Then in the new election, |NW| = 1. As |NW∗| > 1k |NW|, it follows that |NW∗| = 1.
Thus, the size of NW∗ will determine if A is a possible winner. 
3.2. Weighted votes
We now show that, with weighted votes, when we have at least a certain number of candidates, it is intractable in
the worst-case to compute the possible and necessary winners, both with an unbounded number of candidates and with a
bounded number of candidates.
3.2.1. Bounded number of candidates
When we have weighted agents and a bounded number of candidates, computing possible and necessary winners is
computationally intractable in the worst case. To show this, we will consider as voting rule the cup (also known as knockout
or sequential majority voting) rule.
Deﬁnition 12 (Cup rule). The cup rule [16] maps proﬁles into a single candidate, called the winner. The winner is the result
of a series of pairwise majority elections between candidates. The cup rule is deﬁned by a binary tree (also called an
agenda), with as many leaves as the number of candidates, where each leaf is labeled with one candidate. Each non-leaf
is assigned to the winner of the majority election between the candidates labeling the children. The candidate labeling the
root is the overall winner.
In all our proofs, we use a balanced binary tree, but this is not necessary for the results to go through.
Example 10. Assume we have three candidates A, B , and C , and the cup rule as voting rule. Consider the agenda where A
must ﬁrst play against B , and then the winner, called w1, must play against C . The winner, called w2, is the overall winner.
If we have a proﬁle p = ((A > B > C); (A > C > B); (C > A > B)), then w1 = A and w2 = A, i.e., the overall winner of the
cup rule is A.
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WeightedBoundedPossibleWinner(r) holds iff A is a possible winner of the election.
Theorem 6.WeightedBoundedPossibleWinner(Cup) is NP-complete when there are 3 or more candidates.
Proof. Let us consider candidate A. Membership in NP follows by giving a completion of the proﬁle in which A wins. We
give a reduction from the number partitioning problem. Consider the cup where A plays B and the winner thus plays C .
We have a bag of integers, ki with sum 2k and we wish to decide if they can be partitioned into two bags, each with sum
k. We will show that we can build an election where we can complete the incomplete weighted proﬁle so that C wins (i.e.,
C is a possible winner) iff such a partition exists. We suppose the following votes are given: 1 vote for C > B > A of weight
1, 1 vote C > A > B of weight 2k − 1, and 1 vote B > C > A of weight 2k − 1. Hence, C is ahead of A by 4k − 1 votes,
C is ahead of B by 1 vote and B is ahead of A by 1 vote. For each ki in the bag of integers, we have an incomplete vote
of weight 2ki in which A > C is ﬁxed, but the rest of the vote is incomplete. We are sure A beats C in the ﬁnal result by
1 vote whatever completion takes place. We now show that the incomplete weighted proﬁle can be completed so that B
beats A and C beats B (and thus C is a possible winner) iff there is a partition of size k.
Assume that such a partition exists, and that votes in one partition have A > C > B and the votes in the other have
B > A > C . Thus, B beats A overall and C beats B . Thus C is the winner.
On the other hand, suppose there is a way to complete the preferences so that C wins. This can only happen if B beats
A and C then beats B . In fact, if A beats B in the ﬁrst round, A will beat C in the second round, since we have shown
before that A beats C overall, and then A will be the ﬁnal winner. For C to beat B , at least half the weight of incomplete
votes must rank C above B . Similarly, for B to beat A, at least half the weight of incomplete votes must rank B above A.
Since all votes rank A above C , B cannot be both above A and below C . Thus precisely half the weight of incomplete votes
ranks B above A and half ranks C above B . Hence, we have a partition of equal weight. Therefore, we can complete the
incomplete proﬁle so that C wins iff there is a partition of size k. 
Given an incomplete weighted proﬁle over a bounded number of candidates, a voting rule r and a candidate A, we say
WeightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(r) holds iff A is a necessary winner of the election.
Theorem 69 in [7] shows that constructive manipulation (i.e., a manipulation done to make somebody win) by a coali-
tion of agents with weighted votes is polynomial. Thus, it follows immediately that, if we have a partial weighted proﬁle,
it is polynomial to determine if A is a necessary winner. It is, in fact, suﬃcient to test if the manipulation for any
other candidate is successful. This is polynomial, since we are assuming a bounded number of candidates. However, this
is a restricted case since incompleteness occurs only in a speciﬁc form. The following theorem shows that, in general,
WeightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(r) is a computationally intractable problem.
Theorem 7.WeightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(Cup) is coNP-complete when there are 4 or more candidates.
Proof. Assume we are considering candidate A. The complement problem is in NP since we can show membership by
giving a completion of the proﬁle in which A does not win. To show that with 4 or more candidates it is NP-hard, we give
a reduction from the number partitioning problem. We have a bag of positive integers, ki with sum 2k and we wish to
decide if they can be partitioned into two bags, each with sum k. We will build an incomplete proﬁle such that A is not a
necessary winner if and only if there is such a partition. We will consider the cup where D plays against C , and the winner
then plays against B . The winner of this match goes forward to the ﬁnal match against A.
We construct an incomplete proﬁle where the following votes are given: 1 vote for B > A > C > D of weight 1, 1 vote
B > A > D > C of weight 2k− 1, and 1 vote A > C > B > D of weight 2k− 1. For the ﬁrst number, k1 in the bag of integers,
we have a vote for A > C > D > B of weight 2k1. For each other number, ki where i > 1, we have an incomplete vote of
weight 2ki in which D > B is ﬁxed, but the rest of the vote is incomplete. We are sure that D beats B in the ﬁnal result by
1 vote whatever completion takes place. Similarly, we are also sure that A beats D , and A beats C .
Thus, the only winners in the considered cup are A or B . If we complete preferences so that in all incomplete votes we
have A > B , then A will win overall. We now show that there is a completion that makes B win iff there is a partition of
equal weight.
Suppose there is such a partition and that the complete votes in one partition have C > D > B and the complete votes
in the other have D > C > B . Thus, C beats D overall, and B beats C . We suppose also that enough of the incomplete votes
are completed with B > A for B to beat A. Thus B is the overall winner.
On the other hand, suppose there is a way to complete the preferences so that B wins. This can only happen if C beats
D , B then beats C and B ﬁnally beats A. If D beats C in the ﬁrst round, D will beat B in the second round and then go out
to A. For B to beat C , at least half the weight of incomplete votes must rank B above C . Similarly, for C to beat D , at least
half the weight of incomplete votes must rank C above D . Since all votes rank D above B , C cannot be both above D and
below B . Thus precisely half the weight of incomplete votes ranks C above D and half ranks B above C . Hence, we have a
partition of equal weight. Therefore, B can win iff there is a partition of equal weight. Thus, A is not a necessary winner iff
there is a partition of size k. 
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Complexity results of computing/testing possible and necessary winners, and of ﬁnding an upper approximation of possible winners and a lower approxi-
mation of necessary winners.
Weighted+Bounded Unweighted+Bounded Weighted+Unbounded Unweighted+Unbounded
PW NP-complete (Cup, Th. 6) P (Th. 1) NP-complete (Cup, Cor. 7.1) NP-complete (STV, Th. 2)
NW coNP-complete (Cup, Th. 7) P (Th. 1) coNP-complete (Cup, Cor. 7.2) coNP-complete (STV, Th. 3)
PW∗ ? P (Th. 1) NP-hard (STV, Cor. 7.3) NP-hard (STV, Th. 4)
NW∗ ? P (Th. 1) NP-hard (STV, Cor. 7.4) NP-hard (STV, Th. 5)
It is an interesting open question to determine if WeightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(Cup) is polynomial when there
are 3 or fewer candidates.
3.2.2. Unbounded number of candidates
Theorems 6 and 7 show that testing possible and necessary winners is NP-hard when we have a bounded number of
candidates. These worst-case complexity results continue to hold when we have an unbounded number of candidates.
Given an incomplete weighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, a voting rule r and a candidate A, we
say WeightedUnboundedPossibleWinner(r) holds iff A is a possible winner of the election.
Corollary 7.1.WeightedUnboundedPossibleWinner(Cup) is NP-complete when there are 3 or more candidates.
Proof. A witness which can be checked in polynomial time is again a completion of the proﬁle in which a candidate A
wins. NP-hardness holds using the same argument as Theorem 6. 
Given an incomplete weighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, a voting rule r and a candidate A, we
say WeightedUnboundedNecessaryWinner(r) holds iff A is a necessary winner of the election.
Corollary 7.2.WeightedUnboundedNecessaryWinner(Cup) is coNP-complete when there are 4 or more candidates.
Proof. A witness for the complement problem which can be checked in polynomial time is again a completion of the proﬁle
in which a candidate A does not win. NP-hardness holds using the same argument as Theorem 7. 
If we have weighted votes, then, as in the case with unweighted votes, we cannot approximate eﬃciently the set of
possible and necessary winners within some ﬁxed ratio.
Corollary 7.3. Given the STV rule and an incomplete weighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, it is NP-hard to return
a superset of its possible winners, PW∗ , in which we guarantee |PW∗| < k|PW| for some given positive integer k.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4. If it is NP-hard to ﬁnd a certain approximation of the possible winners when we have
unweighted votes, then it is also NP-hard to ﬁnd this approximation when we have weighted votes. To show this we can
use the same proof used to prove Theorem 4 assuming that all the weights are equal to one. 
Corollary 7.4. Given the STV rule and an incomplete weighted proﬁle over an unbounded number of candidates, it is NP-hard to return
a subset of its necessary winners, NW∗ , in which we guarantee |NW∗| > 1k |NW| whenever |NW| > 0 for any given positive integer k.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 5 for the same reasoning performed in the proof of Corollary 7.3, i.e., if it is NP-hard to
ﬁnd a certain approximation of the necessary winners when we have unweighted votes, then it is also NP-hard to ﬁnd this
approximation when we have weighted votes. To show this we can use the same proof used to prove Theorem 5 assuming
that all the weights are equal to one. 
3.3. Summary of the complexity results
All our complexity results are summarized in Table 1. It is possible to see that the only case where it is computationally
easy in the worst-case to ﬁnd possible and necessary winners, is when we have unweighted votes and a bounded number of
candidates. Such a case is of interest to social choice [2] where human elections are analyzed: all the agents have the same
importance, thus agents are unweighted, and they vote on a bounded number of candidates. Being able to ﬁnd easily the
set of possible and necessary winners is useful, as we will see below, for example to decide when to terminate a preference
elicitation process [6]. In fact, when the set of possible winners coincides with the set of necessary winners, elicitation can
be stopped, thus avoiding posing useless questions to agents.
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number of candidates, then the complexity of testing if a candidate is a possible or a necessary winner becomes an in-
tractable problem in the worst-case. Weights are typical in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) applications. For example, they are
useful in multi-agent systems where there are different types of agents. Moreover, in AI, differently from human elections,
it is very common to have an unbounded number of alternatives to consider when making a decision. The hardness results
that we have shown in these settings can be useful as a barrier to manipulation. Gibbard–Satterthwaite’s theorem [13,21]
states that, under some reasonable conditions, there exist circumstances where it is possible to manipulate an election, i.e.,
it is possible that some agent reveals insincerely his preferences to obtain a better result. Our complexity results show that
manipulation is computationally intractable in the worst-case. In fact, since it is intractable to know if a candidate is a pos-
sible winner, a coalition of agents may have little incentive to complete their votes insincerely to make him win. Moreover,
since it is intractable to ﬁnd out if a candidate is a necessary winner, a coalition of agents may have little incentive to
complete their votes insincerely to make him lose.
In the cases considered above (that is, unbounded number of candidates and weighted/ unweighted agents) we have
shown that, it is intractable in the worst-case not only to test if a candidate is a possible or a necessary winner, but also
to ﬁnd good approximations of such sets of winners. In particular, we have shown that computing an upper approximation
of the possible winners and a lower approximation of the necessary winners is an intractable problem in the worst case.
We conjecture that such a computation might be easy when we consider a bounded number of candidates (and weighted
votes). We plan to investigate such a scenario in the future.
4. Tractable cases
We now determine suﬃcient conditions on the preference aggregation function that make it polynomial to compute the
sets of possible and necessary winners. We recall that such a computation is polynomial when votes are unweighted and
there is a bounded number of candidates, while in all the other cases it is intractable in the worst-case. We will show that
in all these cases, if we require that the social welfare function associated with the preference aggregation function be IIA
and monotonic, it is polynomial to compute the possible and necessary winners.
4.1. Unweighted votes
When we have unweighted votes, testing possible and necessary winner, as well as ﬁnding good approximations of such
sets, is only intractable in the worst-case when we have an unbounded number of candidates. We show that, in this case, if
the preference aggregation function is IIA and monotonic, possible and necessary winners can be computed in polynomial
time by starting from an approximation of the combined result, that can be computed in polynomial time.
When instead we have a bounded number of candidates, we have shown in the previous section that is polynomial to
compute possible and necessary winners in general. Thus, trivially, it continues to remain polynomial if we require that the
preference aggregation function satisﬁes such properties.
4.1.1. Unbounded number of candidates
The problem of computing the combined result is in general computationally intractable in the worst-case. However, we
identify some restrictions which allow us to compute a useful approximation of the combined result in polynomial time.
Theorem 8. Given an incomplete proﬁle, determining if a label is in an arc in the combined result is NP-hard for STV.
Proof. The necessary winner problem can be reduced to this problem using a Cook reduction. In particular, to check if a
candidate is a necessary winner it is suﬃcient to check if in the combined result, in every arc connecting this candidate to
another candidate, there is not the relation ‘smaller or equal’. By Theorem 3, testing if a candidate is a necessary winner is
NP-hard for STV. Thus determining if a label is in an arc in the combined result is also NP-hard. 
We now identify some properties of preference aggregation functions which allow us to compute an upper approximation
of the combined result in polynomial time. An upper approximation of a combined result cr is a graph cr∗ with the same
arcs and the same nodes as cr, and where the set of labels of every arc between every pair of candidates A and B in cr∗ ,
say rel∗(A, B) is a superset of the set of labels of the same arc in cr. We recall that the set of labels of an arc between A
and B in the combined result is called rel(A, B).
First, we show how to compute rel∗(A, B) when the preference aggregation function is IIA and monotonic. Then, we will
show that rel∗(A, B) is a superset of rel(A, B), and thus that cr∗ is an upper approximation of cr.
Algorithm 1 takes as input two candidates A and B , a preference aggregation function f , and an incomplete proﬁle
ip, and it returns rel∗(A, B), i.e., a set of labels of an arc between A and B in cr∗ . Since f is IIA, to compute the set
rel∗(A, B), we just need to ask each agent their preference over the pair A and B , and then use f to compute all possible
results between A and B . Since f is monotonic, we don’t need to consider all possible completions for all agents with
incompleteness between A and B , but just two completions: the completion, called S1, where every A?B is replaced with
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Input: A, B: candidates, ip: incomplete proﬁle;
Output: rel∗(A, B): sets of ordering’s operators;
S(ip, A, B) ← {(AxB) ∈ ip, such that x ∈ {>,<,,∼,?}};
S1 ← S where every ? is replaced by <;
S2 ← S where every ? is replaced by >;
A rel1 B ← f (S1);
A rel2 B ← f (S2);
rel∗(A, B) = {operators between rel1 and rel2 (both included) in the total pre-order >,( or ∼),< };
return rel∗(A, B);
Algorithm 2. Computing NW and PW
Input: cr∗( f , ip), where f : IIA and monotonic preference aggregation function and ip: incomplete proﬁle;
Output: P , N: sets of candidates;
P ← Ω;
N ← Ω;
foreach A ∈ Ω do
if ∃ C ∈ Ω such that {<} ⊆ rel∗(A,C) then
N ← N \ A;
if ∃ C ∈ Ω such that {<} = rel∗(A,C) then P ← P \ A;
return P , N;
A < B , and the completion, called S2, where every A?B is replaced with A > B . Notice that, since f is IIA, we don’t need
to consider complete proﬁles, but just the part of the proﬁle concerning A and B . This means that transitivity issues do not
arise. Function f applied to S1 (resp., S2) returns a result that we call A rel1 B (resp., A rel2 B), where rel1 and rel2 are in
the set {<,>,∼,}. Since f is monotonic, the results of all the other completions of ip will necessarily be between rel1
and rel2 (both included) in the ordering >, ( or ∼), <. By taking all such relations, we obtain rel∗(A, B).
We will now show that cr∗ is an approximation of the combined result that is polynomial to compute.
Theorem 9. Given an incomplete proﬁle ip and a social welfare function f that is IIA and monotonic, it is possible to compute in poly-
nomial time an approximation of cr( f , ip), say cr∗( f , ip) such that, given two candidates A and B, rel∗(A, B) ⊇ rel(A, B). Moreover,
if rel∗(A, B) = {<,>,,∼}, then either rel∗(A, B) = rel(A, B) or rel∗(A, B) − rel(A, B) ⊆ {,∼}.
Proof. If f is IIA and monotonic, the set rel∗(A, B) returned by Algorithm 5.2 is a superset of rel(A, B). In fact, monotonicity
of f assures that, if we consider proﬁles where A < B and we get a certain result, then considering proﬁles where A is
in a better position w.r.t. B (that is, A > B , A = B , or A  B), will give an equal or better situation for A in the result.
Thus, cr∗( f , ip) is an upper approximation of the combined result. Moreover, if rel(A, B) = {<,>,,∼}, then there is a
completion where > is in the result, that is, the completion where we replace every A?B with A > B , and there is a
completion where < is the result, that is, the completion where we replace every A?B with A < B . Hence, the only labels
that can be added from rel(A, B) to rel∗(A, B) are the elements ∼ and . 
Example 11. Consider the Lex rule in which agents are totally ordered and, given any two candidates A and B , the relation
between A and B in the result is the relation given by the ﬁrst agent in the order that does not declare a tie between A and
B . It is easy to see that this rule is both IIA and monotonic. Consider the following incomplete proﬁle ((A > C, B > C, A?B);
(A > B > C)). Then rel∗(A, B) = {<,∼,,>}, whereas rel(A, B) = {<,,>}.
We will now show how to determine the possible and necessary winners, given cr∗( f , ip). Consider the arc between a
candidate A and a candidate C in cr∗( f , ip). Then, if this arc has the label A < C , then A is not a necessary winner, since
there is a candidate C which is better than A in some result. If this arc only has the label A < C , then A is not a possible
winner since we must have A < C in all results. Moreover, consider all the arcs between A and every other candidate C .
Then, if no such arc has label which includes A < C , then A is a necessary winner. Notice, however, that in general, even if
there are no arcs connecting A to every other candidate C with the unique label A < C , A could not be a possible winner.
A could be better than some candidates in every completion, but there might be no completion where it is better than all
of them. We will show that this is not the case if f is IIA and monotonic.
We now deﬁne Algorithm 2, which, given cr∗( f , ip), computes NW and PW in polynomial time.
Theorem 10. Given a preference aggregation function f which is IIA and monotonic, an incomplete unweighted proﬁle ip over an
unbounded number m = |Ω| of candidates, and its approximate combined result cr∗( f , ip), Algorithm 2 terminates in O (m2) time,
returning N = NW and P = PW.
Proof. Algorithm 2 considers, in the worst case, each arc exactly once, thus runs in O (m2) time.
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implies that there is no result in which there exists a candidate C that beats A. Thus, A ∈ NW . On the contrary, A ∈ NW iff
A < C,∀C ∈ Ω , for all results, from which, A ∈ N .
P = PW . A candidate A is in PW if there is no other candidate which beats it in all results. Thus, there cannot exist any
other candidate C such that < is the only label in rel(A,C) and, thus by construction, also in rel∗{A,C}. Thus, PW ⊆ P . To
show the other inclusion we consider A ∈ P and we construct a completion of ip such that A wins in its result. First, let us
point out that for any candidate A, A ∈ P iff C ∈ Ω , rel∗(A,C) = {<}. If ∀C ∈ Ω , </∈ rel∗(A,C), then A is never beaten by
any other candidate C and A is NW and, thus, a PW . Secondly, let us consider the case in which A is such that whenever
<∈ rel∗(A,C), either  or > (or both) are also in rel∗(A,C) and let us denote with X such a set of candidates. Then for every
candidate in C ∈ X we choose > whenever available and  otherwise. This corresponds to replacing A?C with A > C in the
incomplete proﬁle. Such choice on AC arcs cannot cause a transitivity inconsistency and thus can be completed to a result in
which A is a winner. Finally, let us consider the case in which there is at least a C such that rel∗(A,C) = {<,∼}. If for every
other candidate C ′ , rel∗(A,C ′) contains exactly one label from the set: {>,,∼} then we can safely set A?C to A = C since
there is, for sure, a result with that labeling. Moreover, in such a result A is a winner. Assume, instead, that there is at least
a candidate C ′ such that |rel∗(A,C ′)| > 1. This means that there is at least an agent which has not declared his preference
on the pair (A,C ′) and that such preference cannot be deduced by transitivity closure. We replace A?C ′ with A > C ′
everywhere in the proﬁle, we perform the transitive closure of all the modiﬁed partially speciﬁed POs, and we apply f . We
will prove that such transitive closure does not force label < on the pair (A,C). After the procedure, due to monotonicity,
rel(A,C ′) will contain exactly one label from the set: {>,,∼}. Let us assume that, after the procedure, A = C ′ and let us
now consider rel(C ′,C). Had it been rel∗(C ′,C) = {<} from the start, this would have forced rel(A,C) = {<}. However, this
is not possible since A ∈ P . This allows us to conclude that (rel∗(C ′,C) ∩ {>,,∼}) = ∅ and any of such additional labels
together with A = C ′ can never force A < C . Clearly, if A > C ′ or A  C ′ , there is no labeling of C ′C which can force A < C .
It should be noticed that any available choice on C ′C can always be made safely due to the fact that the function is IIA and
that the transitive closure of the proﬁles has already ruled out inconsistent choices. By iterating the procedure until every ?
in the incomplete proﬁle is replaced, we can construct a result of the function in which A is a winner. 
4.2. Bounded number of candidates
In the previous section we have shown that when we have an unbounded number of candidates and unweighted votes,
it is polynomial to compute possible and necessary winners when we require that the preference aggregation function
is IIA and monotonic. We can thus directly derive that, under the same assumptions regarding the voting rule, it is also
polynomial if we have a bounded number of candidates.
Corollary 10.1. If the preference aggregation function r is IIA and monotonic, then UnweightedBoundedPossibleWinner(r) and
UnweightedBoundedNecessaryWinner(r) are both polynomial.
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 1. 
4.3. Weighted votes
In the presence of weighted agents, if we assume that the social welfare function is IIA and monotonic, then we can use
the same procedure shown above to ﬁnd the approximate combined result and Algorithm 11 to ﬁnd possible and necessary
winners, since they do not depend on the fact that the agents are weighted or not, but only on IIA and monotonicity.
4.3.1. Unbounded number of candidates
Theorem 10 states that, when the social welfare function is IIA and monotonic, computing possible and necessary win-
ners for unweighted agents and an unbounded number of candidates is polynomial. The same holds also for weighted agents
and an unbounded number of candidates.
Corollary 10.2. Given a preference aggregation function f which is IIA and monotonic, and an incomplete weighted proﬁle ip over an
unbounded number of candidates, and its approximate combined result cr∗( f , ip), it is polynomial to compute the set of possible and
necessary winners.
Proof. It follows from the procedure used to compute cr∗( f , ip), that holds both with and without weighted agents, and by
Theorem 10 that depends only by cr∗( f , ip). 
4.3.2. Bounded number of candidates
Corollary 10.2 implies that, in presence of weighted agents, computing possible and necessary winners continues to be
polynomial also when we have a bounded number of candidates.
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Complexity results of computing possible and necessary winners, given an IIA and monotonic preference aggregation function.
f : IIA + mon. Weighted+Bounded Unweighted+Bounded Weighted+Unbounded Unweighted+Unbounded
PW P (Cor. 10.3) P (Cor. 10.1) P (Cor. 10.2) P (Th. 10)
NW P (Cor. 10.3) P (Cor. 10.1) P (Cor. 10.2) P (Th. 10)
Corollary 10.3. Given a preference aggregation function f which is IIA and monotonic, and an incomplete weighted proﬁle ip over
a bounded number of candidates, and its approximate combined result cr∗( f , ip), it is polynomial to compute the set of possible and
necessary winners.
Proof. It follows immediately from Corollary 10.2. If computing possible and necessary winners is polynomial when we have
an unbounded number of candidates, it continues to be polynomial also when we have a bounded number of candidates. 
4.4. Summary
Table 2 summarizes the complexity results of this section. In particular, when we require that the preference aggregation
function is IIA and monotonic the computation of possible and necessary winners is always polynomial.
5. Elicitation
One use of necessary and possible winners is in eliciting preferences [6]. Preference elicitation is the process of asking
queries to agents in order to determine their preferences over candidates. Eliciting preferences takes time and effort. We
therefore want to stop elicitation as soon as one candidate has enough support that he must win regardless of any miss-
ing preferences. Preference elicitation can be stopped when NW = PW , since we have enough information to declare the
winners. At the beginning, NW is empty and PW contains all candidates. As preferences are declared, NW grows and PW
shrinks. At each step, a candidate in PW can either pass to NW or become a loser. When PW is larger than NW , we can use
these two sets to guide preference elicitation and avoid useless work.
In this section we show that deciding when we can stop eliciting preferences is in general computationally intractable in
the worst-case but it is polynomial when we have unweighted agents and we require an IIA preference aggregation function.
5.1. Complexity of terminating elicitation
We consider two decision problems. Given a voting rule r, if we elicit complete votes from each agent (e.g. “How do
you rank all the candidates?”), CoarseElicitationOver(r) is true iff the winners are determined irrespective of how the
remaining agents vote. On the other hand, if we elicit just individual preferences (e.g. “Do you prefer Bush to Gore?”),
FineElicitationOver(r) is true iff the winners are determined irrespective of how the undeclared preferences are revealed.
Note that in both cases, the missing preferences are assumed to be transitive.
Deﬁnition 13 (CoarseElicitationOver(r)). Input: a partial proﬁle. Output: true iff the set of winners is the same however
the remaining agents vote.
Deﬁnition 14 (FineElicitationOver(r)). Input: an incomplete proﬁle. Output: true iff the set of winners is the same however
the incomplete proﬁle is completed.
CoarseElicitationOver(r) and FineElicitationOver(r) are in coNP as a polynomial witness for elicitation not being over
are two completions of the proﬁle in which different sets of candidates win. Since CoarseElicitationOver(r) is a special case
of FineElicitationOver(r), it is easy to see that if FineElicitationOver(r) is polynomial then CoarseElicitationOver(r) is too.
Similarly, if CoarseElicitationOver(r) is coNP-complete then FineElicitationOver(r) is too. However, as we show later, these
implications do not necessarily reverse. For example, there are voting rules where CoarseElicitationOver(r) is polynomial
but FineElicitationOver(r) is coNP-complete. Our analysis of the complexity of terminating preference elicitation considers,
as in the previous sections, two different dimensions: weighted or unweighted agents, and a bounded or unbounded number
of candidates.
5.1.1. Unweighted agents
We now show that, when we have unweighted agents, computing CoarseElicitationOver(r) and FineElicitationOver(r)
are both polynomial.
Given an incomplete proﬁle over a bounded number of candidates and voting rule r, we say UnweightedBounded-
CoarseElicitationOver(r) holds iff CoarseElicitationOver(r) holds for this election and UnweightedBoundedFineElicita-
tionOver(r) holds iff FineElicitationOver(r) holds for this election.
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Proof. As we have noticed in the proof of Theorem 1, if the number of candidates is bounded, there are only a polynomial
number of different completions. We can thus enumerate and evaluate all these completions in polynomial time. Hence
computing CoarseElicitationOver(r) and FineElicitationOver(r) are both polynomial. 
5.1.2. Weighted votes
We now show that there are voting rules where CoarseElicitationOver(r) is polynomial but FineElicitationOver(r) is
intractable.
Given an incomplete weighted proﬁle over a bounded number of candidates, we say WeightedBoundedCoarse-
ElicitationOver(r) holds iff CoarseElicitationOver(r) holds for this election and WeightedBoundedFineElicitationOver(r)
holds iff FineElicitationOver(r) holds for this election.
Theorem 11. WeightedBoundedFineElicitationOver(Cup) is coNP-complete when there are 4 or more candidates, whilst
WeightedBoundedCoarseElicitationOver(Cup) is polynomial irrespective of the number of candidates.
Proof. Theorem 69 in [7] gives a polynomial algorithm for a coalition of agents with weighted votes to manipulate the
cup rule constructively. We use this algorithm to determine if the coalition of agents who have not voted can manipulate
the election so that each candidate in turn can win. Coarse elicitation is over iff there is only one such winner. Hence,
CoarseElicitationOver(Cup) is polynomial too.
To show that FineElicitationOver(Cup) is coNP-hard with 4 candidates, we can use a reasoning similar to the one in
the proof of Theorem 7, since deciding when FineElicitationOver(Cup) coincides with the problem of determining if there
is a necessary winner. For clarity, we give the formal proof in detail.
To show that FineElicitationOver(Cup) is NP-hard with 4 candidates, consider the cup in which A plays B , the winner
then plays C , and the winner of this match goes forward to the ﬁnal match against D . We will reduce number partitioning
to deciding if elicitation is over for this cup rule given a particular incomplete proﬁle. Suppose we have a bag of integers, ki
with sum 2k and we wish to decide if they can be partitioned into two bags, each with sum k. We construct an incomplete
proﬁle in which the following weighted votes are completely ﬁxed: 1 vote for C > D > B > A of weight 1, 1 vote C > D >
A > B of weight 2k − 1, and 1 vote D > B > C > A of weight 2k − 1. For the ﬁrst number, k1 in the bag of integers, we
have a ﬁxed vote for D > B > A > C of weight 2k1. For each other number, ki where i > 1, we have an incomplete vote of
weight 2ki in which A > C is ﬁxed but the rest of the vote is unspeciﬁed. We are sure A beats C in the ﬁnal result by 1
vote whatever happens. Similarly, we are also sure that D beats A, and D beats B . Thus, the only winners of the cup rule
are D or C . If in all the incomplete votes we have D > C , then D will win overall. We now show that C can win iff there is
a partition of equal weight. Suppose there is such a partition and that the incomplete votes corresponding to one partition
have B > A > C whilst the incomplete votes corresponding to the other partition have A > B > C . Thus, B beats A overall,
and C beats B . We suppose also that enough of the incomplete votes have C > D for C to beat D . Hence C is the winner
of the cup rule and D does not win. On the other hand, suppose C wins. This can only happen if B beats A, C then beats
B and C ﬁnally beats D . If A beats B in the ﬁrst round, A will beat C in the second round and then go out to D . For C
to beat B , at least half the weight of incomplete votes must rank C above B . Similarly, for B to beat A, at least half the
weight of incomplete votes must rank B above A. Since all votes rank A above C , B cannot be both above A and below C .
Thus precisely half the weight of incomplete votes ranks B above A and half ranks C above B . Hence, we have a partition
of equal weight. Therefore, both C and D can win iff there is a partition of equal weight. That is, elicitation is not over iff
there is a partition of equal weight. 
Since, on weighted votes, FineElicitationOver(Cup) is coNP-complete, when there are 4 or more candidates, then in
general, when we have a voting rule on weighted votes with 4 or more candidates, deciding when to terminate elicitation
is coNP-complete.
The result shown in Theorem 11 suggests that, if preferences are being combined with the cup rule, we might prefer
eliciting whole votes from agents as opposed to individual preferences since we can then easily decide when to stop.
Computational complexity can thus motivate the choice of an elicitation strategy. Note that for the cup rule with just 3 or
fewer candidates, it is polynomial to decide if elicitation is over.
Theorem 12. BothWeightedBoundedFineElicitationOver(Cup) andWeightedBoundedCoarseElicitationOver(Cup) are poly-
nomial with 3 or fewer candidates.
Proof. For 2 candidates, the cup rule degenerates to the majority rule, and FineElicitationOver(Cup) degenerates to
CoarseElicitationOver(Cup). In this case, elicitation can be terminated iff a majority in weight of votes prefer one can-
didate. For 3 candidates, without loss of generality, we consider the cup in which A plays B , the winner then plays C .
Suppose we have an incomplete proﬁle over these three candidates. For A to win, they must beat B and C in pairwise
elections. We do not care about the ordering between B and C since if A wins, B and C do not meet. Thus, we complete
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the proﬁle in an analogous fashion. Finally, for C to win they must beat the winner of A and B . We therefore consider two
completions of the proﬁle: one in which C is placed above A, and A above B wherever possible, and the second in which
C is placed above B , and B above A wherever possible. In total, we have just four completions to consider. These can be
tested in polynomial time. Eliciting preferences can be terminated iff the same candidate wins in each case. Given a partial
vote, we complete the proﬁle in a similar way to test CoarseElicitationOver(Cup). 
5.1.3. Uncertainty about votes
Many of our results so far have considered weighted votes. One reason to consider weighted votes is that they inform us
about unweighted votes when we have uncertainty about the votes cast. Given a voting rule r, a probability distribution over
the votes, a number s ∈ [0,1] and a candidate, Evaluation(r) is the problem of deciding if the probability of the candidate
loosing is strictly greater than s. Note that [9] deﬁnes Evaluation(r) to be deciding if the probability of winning is greater
than a given value. The two problems are closely related but we use the former as it makes our arguments simpler. As in
[7], we will assume that any probability distribution over votes is speciﬁed by means of some limited form of language. If
we permitted arbitrary distributions, we would have the problem of specifying the probability of an exponential number of
different proﬁles. This is impractical in general. We therefore suppose that we have a language which requires polynomial
space to specify a probability distribution over unweighted proﬁles in which non-zero probability is given to every proﬁle
equivalent to the completion of a given incomplete weighted proﬁle, and zero probability to every other proﬁle. For instance,
one possible speciﬁcation is simply the incomplete weighted proﬁle. We assume that weights are given in binary and that
it takes polynomial time for a voting rule to compute the winner given a complete weighted proﬁle.
Theorem 13. Given a voting rule r, FineElicitationOver(r) is NP-hard for k candidates on weighted votes implies Evaluation(r) is
also NP-hard for k candidates on unweighted votes.
Proof. We reduce FineElicitationOver(r) to Evaluation(r). Consider an incomplete proﬁle of weighted votes. We compute
one possible completion of this proﬁle and compute who wins. Let this be the candidate A. This takes polynomial time. We
then construct a probability distribution over unweighted votes so that each completion of the weighted proﬁle is drawn
with a non-zero frequency. We set s = 0. For this probability distribution, Evaluation(r) of whether candidate A loses with
probability greater than 0 then decides FineElicitationOver(r) for the original weighted proﬁle. Note that we did not need
to change the number of candidates in the reduction. 
In a similar fashion, we can show that if CoarseElicitationOver(r) on weighted votes is NP-hard then Evaluation(r) is
also. However, this is a weaker result as it has a more speciﬁc hypothesis. There are voting rules like the cup rule for which
CoarseElicitationOver(r) is polynomial but FineElicitationOver(r) is NP-hard. A simple corollary of this theorem is that
we can conclude that Evaluation(Cup) is NP-hard.
Corollary 13.1. Evaluation(Cup) with 4 or more candidates is NP-hard.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 11 and Theorem 13. 
5.2. A tractable case
We now identify a property of the preference aggregation function that allows us to terminate the elicitation process in
polynomial time. We focus on the more general elicitation problem, i.e., on FineElicitationOver(r), that is the problem of,
given voting rule r, deciding when to terminate the elicitation process if we elicit only parts of the agents’ preferences.
We focus on unweighted votes. Moreover, we consider an unbounded number of candidates, since we know that, when
we have unweighted votes and a bounded number of candidates the problem of terminating elicitation is already polyno-
mial. In this context we show that, if the preference aggregation function is IIA, then we can compute in polynomial time
the set of winners of the elicitation process.
Theorem 14. If f is IIA, then determining the set of winners for f in a preference elicitation is polynomial in the number of agents and
candidates.
Proof. We recall that preference elicitation can be stopped when NW = PW , since we have enough information to declare
the winners. At the beginning, NW is empty and PW contains all candidates. As preferences are declared, NW grows and PW
shrinks. At each step, a candidate in PW can either pass to NW or become a loser. When PW is larger than NW , we can use
these two sets to guide preference elicitation. If the preference aggregation function is IIA, then to determine if a candidate
A ∈ PW−NW is a loser or a necessary winner, it is enough to ask agents to declare their preferences over all pairs involving
A and another candidate, say B , in PW . Moreover, IIA allows us to consider just one proﬁle when computing the relations
between A and B in the result, and guarantees that the result is a precise relation, that is, either <, or >, or ∼, or . To
M.S. Pini et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1272–1289 1287Algorithm 3. Winner determination
Input: PW , NW: sets of candidates; f : preference aggregation function;
Output: W : set of candidates;
wins: bool;
while PW = NW do
choose A ∈ PW − NW;
wins← true; P A ← PW − {A};
repeat
choose B ∈ P A ;
if ∃ an agent such that A?B then
ask(A, B);
compute f (A, B);
if f (A, B) = (A > B) then
PW ← PW − {B};
if f (A, B) = (A < B) then
PW ← PW − {A};
wins← false;
P A ← P A − {B};
until f (A, B) = (A < B) or P A = ∅ ;
if wins= true then
NW ← NW ∪ {A};
return NW;
determine all the winners, we thus need to know the relations between A and B for all A ∈ PW − NW and B ∈ PW . There
are examples where all such pairs must be considered. Algorithm 3, in O (|PW|2) steps eliminates enough incompleteness to
determine the winners. At each step, the algorithm asks each agent to express their preferences on a pair of candidates (via
procedure ask(A, B)) and aggregates such preferences via function f . We assume that the effort required by the agents for
answering ask(A, B) is polynomial. Since we assume that all the social welfare functions that we consider are polynomially
computable, it follows that the whole computation is polynomial in the number of agents and candidates. 
Example 12. Consider the incomplete proﬁle shown in Example 2, i.e., ip = ((A > B > C); (A > C, A > B, B?C); (C > A,
A?B, B?C)), and the Pareto social welfare function f deﬁned in Example 3. Algorithm 3 starts by taking PW = {A, B,C},
NW = ∅. Since PW = NW , then the algorithms selects an element from PW − NW . Suppose it selects A. Also, the Boolean
variable wins is set to true, and the set P A , i.e. the set of the possible winners different from A, is {B,C}. Then, an element
of P A , for example B , is chosen and, since there is an agent that says A?B , then the algorithm asks such an agent to reveal
his preference over the pair (A, B), and then it computes f (A, B). Assume A > B for this agent. Since f (A, B) is A > B , B
is a loser, and thus B is removed from PW , thus obtaining PW = {A,C}. B is also removed from P A , and thus P A = {C}.
Since P A is not empty, the body of the repeat loop is performed again. The candidate C ∈ P A is chosen. Since there is
no agent that states A?C , the algorithm simply computes f (A,C), that is, A  C , and C is removed from P A . Since P A
becomes empty, the algorithm exits from the repeat loop and the candidate C is added to NW . At this point PW = {A,C}
and NW = {A}. Since PW = NW , the algorithm performs again the while loop and it chooses C ∈ PW−NW . PC contains only
A, thus it computes f (C, A), which is A  C , then PC becomes empty, and C is added to NW . Since PW = NW = {A,C},
the algorithm terminates returning the winners A and C . Notice that Algorithm 3 has been able to determine the winners,
starting from the incomplete proﬁle ip, asking only one of three ? of the incomplete proﬁle.
If we use the results of the previous sections, under both IIA and monotonicity, we know how to compute eﬃciently
the necessary winners and the possible winners. Thus the output of Algorithm 2 can be given as the input to Algorithm 3,
instead of starting with PW containing all the candidates and NW = ∅.
6. Related work
In [14] preference aggregation functions for combining incomplete total orders are considered. Compared to our work,
we permit both incompleteness and incomparability, while they allow only for incompleteness. Second, they consider social
choice functions which return the (non-empty) set of winners. Instead, we consider social welfare functions which return a
partial order. Social welfare functions give a ﬁner grained view of the result. Third, they consider speciﬁc voting rules like
the Borda procedure, plurality rule, as well as for a non-positional rule like Condorcet, where it is polynomial to compute
possible and necessary winners, whilst we have focused on general properties that ensure tractability.
The problem of characterizing the complexity of the possible and the necessary winner problems has been investigated
also in [23], however they don’t consider the STV voting rule or the cup rule. They show that when the proﬁles are partially
ordered and the votes are unweighted, the possible winner problem for the positional scoring rules, Copeland, maximin,
Bucklin, and ranked pairs is NP-complete, and the necessary winner problem is coNP-complete for the Copeland and ranked
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and Bucklin.
We have shown that with weighted votes and an unbounded number of candidates, testing possible winners for STV
is NP-hard. However, it should be noticed that for many rules used in practice including some positional scoring rules,
deciding if a candidate is a possible winner is polynomial [14]. The complexity of computing possible winners is related
to the complexity of manipulating an election [14]. For instance, it is NP-complete to determine for the Borda, Copeland,
Maximin and STV rules if a coalition can cast weighted votes to ensure a given winner [9]. It follows therefore that with
weighted votes, deciding if a candidate is a possible winner is NP-hard for these rules.
Conitzer and Sandholm prove that CoarseElicitationOver(STV) and FineElicitationOver(STV) are coNP-complete when
votes are unweighted and the number of candidates is unbounded [10]. On the other hand, CoarseElicitationOver(r) and
FineElicitationOver(r) for r ∈ {plurality, Borda, veto,Copeland} with any number of candidates [10]. With weighted votes,
deciding if elicitation is over can be intractable even when the number of candidates is small. For example, Conitzer
and Sandholm prove that CoarseElicitationOver(STV) and FineElicitationOver(STV) are coNP-complete when votes are
weighted and there are just 4 (or more) candidates [10]. However, CoarseElicitationOver(r) and FineElicitationOver(r)
are polynomial for r ∈ {plurality, Borda, veto,Copeland} with weighted votes and any number of candidates [10]. We
have shown that, if we have weighted votes and a bounded number of candidates, there are voting rules where
CoarseElicitationOver(r) is polynomial but FineElicitationOver(r) is intractable.
7. Conclusions and future work
We have considered the aggregation of preferences of multiple agents despite the presence of incompleteness and in-
comparability in the agents’ preferences. In particular, we have focused on the problem of determining if a candidate is a
possible winner (i.e., a winner in at least one possible completion of the agents’ preferences) or if he is a necessary winner
(i.e., a winner in all the completions of the agents’ preferences). We have analyzed the computational complexity of such
problems, considering weighted/unweighted agents and bounded/unbounded number of candidates.
We have shown that only in the case with unweighted agents and a bounded number of candidates these problems
are tractable, while in all the other cases they are intractable. We have also shown that, when we have an unbounded
number of candidates, it is also diﬃcult to ﬁnd a good approximation of the sets of possible and necessary winners. On the
positive side, we have then proved that, when the preference aggregation function is IIA and monotonic, ﬁnding possible
and necessary winners is tractable.
We have then investigated how the knowledge of the possible and necessary winners can be exploited in the context of
preference elicitation, since preference elicitation can be stopped when the set of possible winners coincides with the set
of the necessary winners. We have shown that, in general, deciding when to terminate preference elicitation is intractable.
However, it is polynomial if the preference aggregation function is IIA, since it is suﬃcient to elicit preferences that regard
only the candidates that are possible winners.
Some of our results use IIA which is a strong assumption. However, we use it just to show that intractability is not in-
evitable on incomplete proﬁles. We plan to ﬁnd other cases where IIA can be relaxed. We also plan to consider the addition
of constraints to agents’ preferences. This means that preference aggregation must take into account the feasibility of the
candidates. Thus possible and necessary winners must now be feasible. It is also important to consider compact knowl-
edge representation formalisms to express agents’ preferences, such as CP-nets and soft constraints. Possible and necessary
winners should then be deﬁned directly from such compact representations, and preference elicitation should concern
statements allowed in the representation language. Finally, a possibility or a probability distribution over the completions
of an incomplete preference relation can be used to provide additional information when computing possible and necessary
winners.
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